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This article highlights some of the legal involvements created by the
artificial insemtination of human beings. The practice violates both the
natural law and the common law and, in some jurisdictions, statutory
law. The moral and sociological aspects will be considered in the next
issue.
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: I
LEGAL ASPECTS
ANTHONY F. LOGATTO, M.S.S.S., LL.B.*
T HE STRIDES of science have brought blessings to mankind. Indeed
modern living, stripped of the findings of the laboratory, would be a
toilsome and narrow existence, wherein the struggle for survival would
shackle man to the grim reality of preservation of life and species.
Yet progress has brought its problems too - social, economic, ethical,
legal or a complexion of them. This seems to be the case with artificial
insemination. Originally used in animal husbandry as early as the
eighteenth century (although the so-called "Arab legend" goes back
further than that), it was successfully performed on a human being in
1799 by the famous English physician, John Hunter.' In America, Doc-
tor Marion J. Sims reported his work on artificial human insemination
in 1866.2 It is interesting to note that throughout the nineteenth century
and even in the first two decades of the twentieth century, all the perti-
nent literature with few exceptions refers to homologous artificial insem-
ination, commonly referred to as AIH, wherein the specimen of sperm
used is obtained from the husband of the woman.3 Apparently, the first
report of an instance of heterologous artificial insemination, referred to
as AID, wherein the specimen of semen is obtained from a third party
donor, was made by one A. D. Hard in 1909.4
Today the practice of artificial insemination is common enough and
*Priest of the Diocese of Brooklyn; Associate Director. Catholic Charities; Lec-
turer in Sociology, St. John's University; Member of the New York Bar.
'Glover, Artificial Insemination Among Human Beings 4-5 (1948).
2Id. at 5.
'Id. at 8-9.
'Id. at 11.
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while statistics are necessarily incomplete
because of the secrecy demanded in this
procedure yet available data shows it to be
widespread. 5 A study, 6 completed in 1941,
was made by cir-
rcularizing 30,000
Sphysicians most
likely to be associ-
ated with artificial
insemination. Of
this number, 22,-
358 doctors failed
to reply to the sur-
vey letters. The
survey revealed
that 9,489 chil-
REV. A. F. LoGATTO ta ,8 hl
dren were born in
the United States as a result of artificial
insemination, both homologous and heter-
ologous. The number of "test tube" babies,
as they are called, is estimated to be about
50,000 throughout the United States and at
least 10,000 in New York City. 7 One writer
reports an estimate of 1,000 to 1,200 babies
born yearly in the United States conceived
through artificial insemination as contrasted
with four million normally conceived chil-
dren.8 As evidence of the growing popu-
'See Rohleder, Test Tube Babies. A History of
Artificial Impregnation of Human Beings (1934);
Abel, The Present Status of Artificial Insemina-
tion, Surgery, Gynecology and Obstetrics- Inter-
national Abstracts of Surgery 85 (1947) and
Supplement 521; Folsome, Status of Artificial In-
semination: A Critical Review, 45 Amer. J. Obst.
and Gynec. 915 (1943).
'See Seymour and Koerner, Artificial Insemina-
tion: Present Status in the United States as Shown
by a Recent Survey, 116 J. Amer. Med. Assn.
2747 (June 21, 1941).
'N.Y. Post, Mar. 28, 1955, pp. 4, 18.
Lang, Artificial Insemination - Legitimate or Il-
legitimate?, McCall's 60 (May, 1955). Some of
these statistics, however, have been criticized as to
larity of artifical insemination, two sperm
banks have been set up, one in Iowa and
one in New York. 9 These banks have been
established in order to give attending phy-
sicians a large and diversified number of
specimens from which to match the hus-
band's characteristics.
The subject of artificial insemination is
related, of course, to the problem of fertility
and sterility in marriage. Medical authori-
ties place the number of sterile marriages
at percentages varying from ten to sixteen
percent of all married couples in the United
States.10 "Every year in the United States,"
reports one expert, "about 50,000 women
leave the marriage altar, later to discover
they cannot have children, while about
2,000,000 couples who are of child-bearing
age are constantly in that condition.""
Since medical authorities have found that
sterility is almost as often due to male de-
ficiency as female deficiency,' 2 there are
about one million cases where AID is a
possibility. Aggravating the situation is the
fact that the number of babies available for
adoption is far short of the number of re-
quests for adoption on the part of childless
accuracy and reliability and therefore any figures
given must be treated with reserve at this time.
Folsome, The Status of Artificial Insemination: A
Critical Review, 45 Amer. J. Obst. and Gynec. 913,
917-922 (1943).
'Ratcliff, Are These the Most Loved Children?,
Woman's Home Companion 56 (March, 1955).
"°Warner, Artificial Insemination in Cases of In-
curable Sterility, Papers Delivered before the
Society of Medical Jurisprudence 201 (1954).
2 Brewer, Marriage Hygiene 420 (1936).
"Berustein, Plain Talk About Sterility, Argosy 31
(Jan., 1949). Dr. Warner indicates that the hus-
band is the sterile factor in from thirty to fifty
percent of childless marriages. Warner, supra
note 10 at 200.
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couples.1 3 Expediting adoption procedures
and facilitating foreign adoptions would
help alleviate what is a distressing problem
today with two million childless couples
throughout the nation.
The practice of artificial insemination,
however, poses thorny and perplexing ques-
tions of a legal, ethical and sociological
nature. The legal aspects are in a state of
confusion. Ethically, the position of the
Catholic Church is clear and unequivocal,
but most other denominations are not com-
mitted to one side or the other. Socially, the
impact is still to be determined. It is the
burden of this paper to review the legal
aspects of artificial insemination; the ethical
and sociological aspects will be considered
in a subsequent article.
Early Cases
The earliest case of artificial insemination
to appear on record is a French case in the
Tribunal of Bordeaux, 1883.14 In an action
to collect medical fees, a doctor claimed
1,500 francs for artificial insemination per-
formed on the defendant. The court se-
verely reprimanded the doctor for a breach
of confidential relationship of doctor and
patient and for employing means "contrary
to the natural law and ones which could
constitute a veritable social danger."1'5
A Commission appointed by the Soci6tM
de mdicine lMgale de France to review the
matter, agreed that there had been a viola-
tion of medical secrecy, but did not agree
that artificial insemination was against the
'Approximately I million couples make applica-
tions in the United States to adopt children, but
only 75,000 children are legally available during
that same period. New York Times, Apr. 5, 1952,
p. 18, col. 1.
" 
1 See Glover, op. cit. supra note I at 44.
"Ibid.
natural law and could create a danger to
society. The Commission went further and
gave the opinion that artificial insemination
"was the last chance to obtain procreation
by a correct operation involving not a single
responsibility.' 6 This appears to have been
a case of homologous artificial insemina-
tion.
The next case appears in Dusseldorf,
Germany, in 1905.7 A husband, who al-
leged that there had been no cohabitation
between himself and his wife (there had
been several fruitless attempts early in the
marriage), contested the legitimacy of a
child born to his wife in .1904. After the
husband was examined by a medical expert,
the court denied the husband's action and
affirmed the legitimacy of the child. On ap-
peal to the higher court of Cologne, another
medical expert testified to the impossibility
of artificial fertilization. Despite this medi-
cal expert's testimony, the decision of the
lower court was affirmed in 1907. In 1908,
the German Supreme Court recognized arti-
ficial insemination as legal and held that a
child conceived by the semen of the hus-
band was legitimate and had all the rights
of a legitimate child.
It should be carefully noted at this point
that no court has ever found any difficulty
where the sperm used is that of the hus-
band. Courts have taken the position that
there may be ethical, esthetic and sociologi-
cal aspects involved in homologous artificial
insemination, but that legally the practice
is unobjectionable. The difficulty arises in
heterologous insemination; that is, when a
third party, not the husband, is the source
of the specimen of semen used.
The much-quoted Canadian case of
61lbid.
"Id. at 45.
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Orford v. Orford,18 in 1921, for the first
time expressed an opinion on heterologous
insemination. In the two prior cases, the
courts assumed that insemination had taken
place by the use of the husband's semen.
It is interesting that what attracted special
notice in the Orford case was not the speci-
fic holding of the case, which was one of
ordinary adultery, but rather the dicta,
which commented at length on the legality
of artificial insemination of the extra-mari-
tal type.
The case was brought in the Ontario
Supreme Court as an action for alimony.
The plaintiff and defendant were married
in Toronto, in August, 1913. The couple
sailed to England for the honeymoon. In
November of the same year, the defendant
left his wife in England and returned to
Canada. It was admitted at the trial that
the marriage had not been consummated,
owing, as the plaintiff said, to the great
pain which an attempt at intercourse caused
her, and owing to the fact as she discovered
later, that she had a retroflexed uterus. In
December, 1919, however, the plaintiff re-
turned to Canada but the defendant hus-
band refused to accept her back. The
plaintiff then instituted this action for ali-
mony in January, 1920. The husband's
defense was that the plaintiff, by mutual
agreement, had remained in England to
effect a cure of her physical inability to
consummate the marriage and had not done
so.
While the case was pending, the de-
fendant learned that while the plaintiff was
in England, she had given birth to a child in
February of 1919. The plaintiff admitted
the birth of the child and that the defendant
was not the father. The plaintiff's explana-
158 D. L. R. 251 (1921).
tion was that she had been treated by her
physician for some time in an effort to cure
her inability to consummate the marriage,
but that he refused to operate without her
husband's consent. Instead, the physician
recommended that the plaintiff bear a child
and that artificial insemination be used. A
friend offered to be the donor if the plaintiff
would undergo the insemination and he
further promised to pay all the expenses
connected with her pregnancy and confine-
ment and to adopt the child as his own. The
plaintiff testified that she agreed and that a
physician, whose name she could not re-
member, placed her under an anesthesia.
When she regained consciousness the plain-
tiff was told by the friend that she had been
inseminated artificially by semen taken from
his body and introduced into hers by the
physician. Mrs. Orford further testified that
the procedure was repeated once again in
May, 1918. The plaintiff became pregnant
and a child was born in February, 1919.
The court noted that the plaintiff, "through-
out the whole course of her extraordinary
story seemed to have a very slight apprecia-
tion of the gravity of what she had done."
She constantly referred to it as a "medical
cure" for her affliction.
The court observed that there was noth-
ing "medical" about the insemination nor
was there anything "artificial" about it. It
concluded upon the facts that her story as
to the artificial insemination "is not to be
believed," and found that the plaintiff was
guilty of adultery in that she had had sexual
intercourse in the ordinary way with the
aforementioned friend.
Had the court limited the opinion to the
above facts, the case would probably have
been relegated to dusty archives and for-
gotten. But, to avoid the suggestion that the
plaintiff had been prevented from establish-
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ing as a matter of law that her conduct, as
she related it, did not constitute adultery,
the opinion discussed that aspect of the
case also. It was the contention of the plain-
tiff, first, that it was not adultery for a
woman to become "artificially impregnated"
by means of a man not her husband and
without her husband's knowledge; and, sec-
ond, that even if it might be adultery per se,
it was not so in these circumstances because
what she did was "conduced to" by the
conduct of her husband. Counsel for the
plaintiff argued that to constitute adultery
there must be actual sexual intercourse in
the ordinary, natural way and that the es-
sential element of adultery rested on the
moral turpitude of the act of sexual inter-
course as ordinarily understood. Counsel
also distinguished between the act of adul-
tery and the consequences of it.
In rejecting these arguments, the court
summarized its position with cogency and
clarity:
• . . the essence of the offence of adultery
consists not in the moral turpitude of the act
of sexual intercourse, but in the voluntary
surrender to another person of the repro-
ductive powers or faculties of the guilty
person; and any submission of these powers
to the service or enjoyment of any person
other than the husband or wife comes
within the definition of "adultery."
The fact that it has been held that any-
thing short of actual sexual intercourse, no
matter how indecent or improper the act
may be, does not constitute adultery, really
tends to strengthen my view that it is not
the moral turpitude that is involved, but the
invasion of the reproductive functions. So
long as nothing takes place which can by
any possibility affect that function, there
can be no adultery; so that, unless and
until there is actual sexual intercourse, there
can be no adultery. But to argue from that,
that adultery necessarily begins and ends
there is utterly fallacious. Sexual intercourse
is adulterous because in the case of the
woman, it involves the possibility of intro-
ducing into the family of the husband a
false strain of blood. Any act on the part
of the wife which does that would, there-
fore, be adulterous. That such a thing could
be accomplished in any other than the
natural manner probably never entered the
heads of those who considered the question
before. Assuming the plaintiff's story to be
true, what took place here was the intro-
duction into the body by unusual means of
the seed of a man other than her husband.
If it were necessary to do so, 1 would hold
that in itself was "sexual intercourse." It
is conceivable that such an act performed
upon a woman against her will might con-
stitute rape."
This portion of the opinion, although
dicta, was to be the subject of much com-
ment pro and con. Indeed, more recently
it has been the butt of some very bitter and
caustic attacks.
20
The court, however, was not alone in its
view on what constitutes adultery. Shortly
thereafter, in 1924, Lord Dunedin, in the
case of Russell v. Russell,2 1 made the obser-
vation that the essence of adultery was not
intercourse but rather fecundation ab extra.
Lord Dunedin reported the matter thus:
"... she [the wife] had denied intercourse
of any sort with any man not her husband;
she had admitted that her husband had
never effected penetration.... The jury ...
came to the conclusion that she had been
fecundated ab extra by another man un-
known, and fecundation ab extra is, I doubt
not, adultery. 22
In another English case, L v. L,23 the
.1d. at 258.
'See Warner, supra note 10 at 195; Schwartz,
Some Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination,
18 Queens Bar Bull. 91 (1955).
" [1924] A. C. 687.
"Id. at 721.
-[1949] 1 All E. R. 141.
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parties were married in 1942 and although
there was no physical incapacity on the part
of the husband or wife, the marriage was
never consummated owing to the husband's
psychological attitude in sexual matters.
The wife, however, anxious to bear a child,
was artificially inseminated in December,
1947, from the husband's seed. In January
of the next year, the parties ceased to live
together, although, unknown to the parties,
the wife was pregnant as a result of the
artificial insemination. In September, 1948,
the wife gave birth to a child. In a suit by
the wife for a decree of nullity, the court
held that the wife was not estopped as
against the husband by her conduct because
he was not misled by it into thinking that
the wife had acquiesced in an abnormal
marriage, nor had he as a result of it
altered his position for the worse. The court
went on to say that the conception of the
child under the circumstances did not con-
stitute "approbation" of an abnormal mar-
riage toward the world at large nor did
public policy demand that the court hold
the conduct of the wife to be such an ap-
probation. On the contrary, said the court,
the fact that the decree would bastardize
the child was no ground for refusing the
decree, which was therefore granted on the
ground of incapacity. It would appear,
therefore, that in England artificial insem-
ination alone does not effect the consum-
mation of the marriage.
American Precedents
The first recorded American case involv-
ing artificial insemination appeared as re-
cently as 1948 in the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, In Hoch v. Hoch,2 4 a set
of facts somewhat similar to Orford v. Or-
"Chicago Sun (Feb. 10, 1945); Time Magazine
58 (Feb. 26, 1945).
ford was presented in which extra-marital
artificial insemination was alleged. The
judge found, however, that there had been
adulterous sexual relations in the ordinary
sense and granted the plaintiff husband a
divorce on that ground. The judge ventured
the opinion, by way of dicta, that even if
artificial insemination had been proved it
would not be adultery such as to constitute
grounds for divorce.
Shortly after the Hoch case in Chicago,
the New York case of Strnad v. Strnad
25
was decided. A couple, separated by judi-
cial decree, was before the court at the in-
stance of the wife who contested her hus-
band's right of visitation to a child born
during their marriage. The court assumed,
in the light of the record and the conces-
sions made by the defendant, that the plain-
tiff wife was artificially inseminated with
the consent of the defendant and that the
child was not of the blood of the defendant.
Predicated on that assumption the court
came to the conclusion that the defendant
was entitled to rights of visitation as there-
tofore allowed as the evidence did not show
the defendant an unfit guardian but did in-
dicate that the best interests of the child
called for reasonable visitations.
At this point, the court made an unusual
argument. It ventured the opinion that the
child had been "potentially adopted or
semi-adopted by the defendant" and that
the defendant was "entitled to the same
rights as those acquired by a foster parent
who has formally adopted a child, if not the
same rights as those to which a natural
parent under the circumstances would be
entitled."' 26
.190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (Sup. Ct.
1948).
-"Id. at 787, 78 N.Y.S. 2d at 392.
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In the Strnad case, the first in the United
States to consider at length the issue of
extra-marital artificial insemination, one
senses, with some sympathy, the anxious
efforts of a judge striving in some way to
safeguard the legitimacy of a child faced
with the two-fold jeopardy of disputed pa-
ternity and contested custody. The benevo-
lence of a judge's feelings, however, and
the stringency of his logic are not, unfortu-
nately, always equiparated.
In the Strnad case, the court was hard
put, it seems, to find arguments to sustain
the position that the artificially inseminated
child (by donor) is legitimate. It was the
first to find that such a child was "poten-
tially adopted" or "semi-adopted" by the
husband of the mother. There is little sup-
port for this view in the New York statutes.
The words "potentially adopted" in New
York State mean nothing. Article 7, Sec-
tion 110 of the Domestic Relations Law
provides that an adult husband or an adult
wife may adopt the child of the other
spouse, whether born in or out of wedlock.
But the same section provides that no per-
son shall be adopted except in accordance
with Article 7 of such law which provides
specifically that an adoption is a legal pro-
ceeding of a judicial nature.
Therefore, unless there is a formal, legal
adoption of the child by the husband of the
mother the status of the child remains un-
changed. In this case, since no legal adop-
tion was alleged or proved, the only con-
clusion open to the court should have been
that the child was illegitimate. For implicit
in the reasoning of the court was the prem-
ise that the child was born out of wedlock;
otherwise why postulate a "potential"
adoption? The inconsistency of holding a
child admittedly born out of wedlock, legiti-
mate, because of an "adoption" which in
law never took place, is obvious. In this
instance it must be attributed to the efforts
of the court to steer between two undesired
results - either of declaring this child (and
all other children so conceived) illegitimate
or of deliberately evading the provisions of
the law.
The court in the Strnad case extended it-
self in the interest of preserving a child's
legitimacy. The learned justice says in the
course of his opinion: "assuming again that
the plaintiff was artificially inseminated
with the consent of the defendant this child
is not an illegitimate child. Indeed, logically
and realistically, the situation is no differ-
ent than that pertaining in the case of a
child born out of wedlock who by law is
made legitimate upon the marriage of the
interested parties. '2 7 That rule of law ob-
tains only when the actual mother and
father of a child born out of wedlock marry
each other. But in this case, the father of
the child is admittedly not the husband of
the mother and certainly never married the
mother. The illegitimacy of the child which
was only implicit in the opening paragraphs
of the opinion is here spelled out in express
language. Since the inter-marriage of father
and mother is definitely excluded, it would
seem that on appeal the holding of the
lower court would be reversed on the basis
of this reasoning alone. Apparently in the
nature of a saving clause, the court con-
cludes the opinion with some modest limi-
tations: "The court does not pass on the
legal consequences insofar as property
rights are concerned in a case of this char-
acter, nor does the court express an opin-
ion, on the propriety of procreation by the
medium of artificial insemination. With
such matters the court is not here con-
cerned; the latter problem particularly is
'190 Misc. 786, 787, 78 N.Y.S. 2d 390, 392 (Sup.
Ct. 1948).
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in the fields of sociology, morality and re-
ligion." 28
To complicate the matter further, Mrs.
Strnad, subsequent to this decision re-
moved the child from the New York juris-
diction by taking it to Oklahoma. The New
York court held the wife in contempt for
refusing to obey the court order allowing
the husband visitation rights. 29 But an
Oklahoma court held that the husband had
no rights of visitation because he was not
the biological father of the child °0
This was the legal status of artificial in-
semination until late in 1954 when the
matter was revived in the now famous case
of Doornbos v. Doornbos.' The plaintiff
wife, appearing in Superior Court of Cook
County, Illinois, asked for a declaratory
judgment on the following:
1. Artificial insemination is not contrary
to public policy.
2. Artificial insemination does not con-
stitute adultery.
3. A child born of artificial insemina-
tion is legitimate and the child of the
mother only and the father or hus-
band has no rights to said child.
The court, however, held that:
1. Heterologous Artificial Insemination
(when the specimen of semen used is
obtained from a third party or do-
nor), with or without the consent of
husband, is contrary to public policy
and good morals and constitutes adul-
tery on the part of the mother. A
child so conceived is not a child born
"Ibid.
2183 N.Y.S. 2d 391 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
"'Caddy. Artificial Human Insemination, 12 N.Y.
Co. Lawyers Bar Bull. 193 (1955).
"'No. 54 S. 14981 (Superior Ct., Cook Co. Dec.
13, 1954).
in wedlock and therefore illegitimate.
As such it is the child of the mother
and the father has no right or interest
in said child.
2. Homologous Artificial Insemination
(when the specimen of semen used is
obtained from the husband of the
woman) is not contrary to public
policy and good morals, and does not
present any difficulty from the legal
point of view.
This opinion caused an avalanche of
public comment by the popular press, pro-
fessional groups and individuals. Newspa-
per articles featured such catching headlines
as "Tempest in a Test Tube," "Test Tube
Mother Ruled Adultress," "Test Tube Adul-
tery Affirmed by Court." Bar journals, legal
and medical periodicals, rushed to the fore
with particular views although only one of
the professional organizations has taken an
official position on the matter.3 2 The subject
was a bonanza for the popular magazines,
many of which ran articles on the decision
and the general subject of artificial insem-
ination; some of which were very indignant
and heart-tugging.
Most of the popular literature favors the
practice of AID, demanding that the vari-
ous legislatures enact statutes to legitimatize
AID babies and bring happiness to so many
thousands of hopeless, hapless couples
whose marriages were ready to disintegrate
for lack of a bouncing baby in their midst.
Most of the authors evaluated the matter
from an emotional point of view. Some re-
lied on the asexual nature of the insemination
'The American Society for the Study of Sterility
has approved the practice. N.Y. Times, June 5,
1955, p. 53, col. 1. Exception to this position was
taken by the Federation of Catholic Physicians at
the guild's annual meeting. The Register, June 19,
1955, p. 1, col. 7.
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process to exclude any question of adultery
or immorality, arguing that since there is no
carnal connection, artificial insemination is
no more immoral than a blood transfusion
or a corneal transplant. Few came to grips
with the more basic thinking as expressed
in the Orford case which measured the
morality of artificial insemination by the
exclusiveness of the reproductive functions
and the purity of the blood strain. Most
proponents of artificial insemination rest
their case on the cruelty and heartlessness
of leaving so many couples in the barren-
ness and emptiness of a childless home. The
opponents rely substantially on the reason-
ing of the Orford case and see no escape
from its logic and straight, down-the-line
thinking.
The next step lies with the appellate
courts, when and if the issue of artificial
insemination is presented to them for re-
view. In the meanwhile, the law is confusing
and inconsistent.
Question of Legitimacy
In Canada, relying on the Orford case,
the "test tube" child (by donor) would
seem to be illegitimate. In England, a child
born as a result of homologous artificial
insemination would now be considered leg-
itimate as a statute has been enacted to
overcome the decision of the L case.3 -3
In the United States, it depends on the
jurisdiction. In New York, the child is legit-
imate on the shaky reasoning of the Strnad
case. In Illinois, according to the Doornbos
case, the child is not legitimate.
Even in those jurisdictions where an AID
child is considered illegitimate, the problem
of establishing the illegitimacy of the child
would, in most instances, be difficult. The
'Law Reforms Act of 1949, c. 100.
general rule in the United States is that a
child born in lawful wedlock is presumed
legitimate. This presumption is rebuttable
but only by evidence irrefragably establish-
ing the illegitimacy. A probability will not
suffice. The law is equally as clear in most
jurisdictions that the testimony of either
of the spouses or both of them, as to non-
access, is inadmissible to rebut the pre-
sumption. Moreover, in most states, neither
husband nor wife can testify concerning
adultery. It would seem therefore, that nei-
ther husband nor wife could testify that the
child had been conceived through artificial
insemination.
In those jurisdictions where the AID
child is not legitimate, the status of the
child is the same as that of children born
out of wedlock. The child, therefore, may
not inherit from the estate of the donor. The
possibility that an AID child may or may
not be legitimate according to the place of
his birth creates additional problems. Ques-
tions of citizenship might arise when the
donor is domiciled elsewhere than the
mother. In one case a specimen of semen
was flown from a bank in New York to
Montreal. 34 A legal question as to the citi-
zenship of the child - whether American or
Canadian - might arise. To determine that
question would affect not only the citizen-
ship of the child but his legitimacy, since in
Canada it would appear such a child is
illegitimate whereas in New York he would
be legitimate.
Question of Adultery
Further difficulties exist, multiplying
themselves by the number of people in-
volved. If the child is implicitly illegitimate,
is the mother therefore an adulteress? Can
3
'Ratcliff, Are These the Most Loved Children?,
Woman's Home Companion 56 (March, 1955).
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you have the legitimate birth of an illegiti-
mate child? Can the husband of a woman
who was inseminated without his knowl-
edge and consent proceed against her in an
action for divorce on the grounds of adul-
tery? Admittedly, if with the husband's
knowledge and consent, he is estopped by
his own complicity.35
Adultery in civil law, especially in di-
vorce proceedings, is not as specifically de-
fined as in criminal law. The crime of
adultery is determined by the statute of the
particular jurisdiction in which the crime is
prosecuted. Furthermore, criminal statutes
are always strictly construed. Hence, evi-
dence which might be adequate as grounds
for a decree of divorce may be insufficient
to sustain a prosecution for the crime of
adultery.
If the husband has not consented to the
artificial insemination, the husband may
have an action in damages against the doc-
tor and the donor. If insemination leads to
illegitimacy and adultery, is it not automati-
cally forbidden by law as against strong
public policy?
Liability of Physician
The physician involved in artificial in-
semination also finds himself in a very pre-
carious position. If the mother, in an AID
case, is under the age of consent there is a
possibility that the physician may be guilty
of statutory rape.
A more concrete problem presents itself
in the matter of birth certificates and rec-
ords. Where the attending physician at birth
was also the attending physician at the in-
semination, whose name should he inscribe
as the father of the child? If he puts the
donor's name, or says the father is unknown,
'See e. g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §1153.
the child is at once branded as illegitimate.
If he inserts the husband's name, he is guilty
of falsifying an official record. One solution
adopted by some doctors is to let another
physician, without any knowledge of the
artificial nature of the conception, handle
the confinement and delivery. In good faith,
the second physician writes in the husband's
name as the father of the child. Obviously
this is an evasion rather than an avoidance
of the law and introduces deception and
trickery into a profession where ethical be-
havior is of paramount importance.
There are other pitfalls which attend the
physician as he is called upon to enter the
new pathways of science. In the event that
legitimate children were to be born in the
same family where an AID child had been
introduced (and it happens often enough
in adoption cases) may they charge that the
physician had conspired to deprive them of
their lawful share of an inheritance?
In one case in which the husband of a
woman who had an AID child was indicted
for abandonment, the child was reported
to have been mongoloid.3 6 If this were so,
might a cause of action lie against the doc-
tor who performed the insemination? One
writer asks rather impertinently "Is there a
real or implied warranty on his [the physi-
cian's] part as to the 'quality' of the donor
he selects, his antecedents, his stock, etc.? 3 7
The Bureau of Legal Medicine and Legisla-
tion of the American Medical Association
reported that the physician risks an action
for malpractice because of unsatisfactory
results due to the unfitness of the donor.381
Under the general rule of malpractice, the
"People v. Warhaftig, Ind. No. 41-54 (Queens Co.
Ct. 1954).
"'Schwartz, stipra note 20 at 90.
'147 J. Amer. Med. Assn. 250 (Sept. 15, 1951).
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amount of care to be used by the physician
varies with the circumstances of each case.
In an undertaking of this sort the nature of
the case would require care in a degree
never before assumed by the medical pro-
fession. "In AID, the physician acts as the
agent to bring into being a life outside the
marriage relation. Even ignoring the moral
aspects of the case, that is new and outside
the scope of anything the physician has ever
undertaken before."3 9
Liability of the Donor
The legal position of the donor in artifi-
cial insemination is one largely of liabilities
and responsibilities. It looks as if he has
Iittle to gain and possibly much to lose.
The donor may possibly be held for the
support of the child or children he has
fathered, in the event that the husband of
the mother should refuse at any time to sup-
port the "test tube" baby. For example, in
New York, Section 101 of the Social Wel-
fare Law provides that the father of a per-
son liable to become in need of public as-
sistance or care shall be responsible for the
support of such person. In New York City,
the parents of an illegitimate child are li-
able for its support and the father is also
liable for support of the mother. 40 What are
the liabilities if the same donor should father
many such children, maybe scores of them
or possibly a hundred? The curious question
presents itself, however, whether were he
ever to be bothered by conscience or stirred
by some parental urge, could he ever secure
knowledge of his offspring and press at least
for rights of visitation? It is easy to see the
devastating effects such an eventuality could
have on the husband, mother and child; yet
'"Schlemer, Artificial Insemination and the Law,
30 Mich. S. B. J. 51 (1953).
'"N.Y.C. Crim. Cts. Act §62.
in the absence of controlling legislation, it
remains a disturbing possibility.
If potential or actual adoption of the AID
child by the husband of the mother is
deemed to occur in those cases in which the
husband of the mother consents to the arti-
ficial insemination, then there is some ques-
tion as to whether the consent of the father
of the child, the donor, has been obtained.
For example, Section 111 of the Domestic
Relations Law of New York provides that
consent to adoption shall be required of the
parents of a child born out of wedlock. In
AID, must this consent of the donor be pro-
cured or is it "potential" and "implicit"?
The section makes no provision for such
modes of consent. It might be argued that
in surrendering the semen the donor thereby
gives his consent to the adoption of the child
to be. But can consent to adoption be given
at a time when no child is in existence? Or,
is the consent of the father unnecessary since
the same section provides that the consent
shall not be required of a parent who has
abandoned or surrendered the child? Does
a donor in the act of donating or selling his
seed thereby renounce all rights to the en-
suing offspring? And is this a legal surren-
der or abandonment?
Inadequacy of Proposed Solution
One solution to some of the problems
created by artificial insemination, offered by
many in good faith, is that the AID child
be legally adopted by the husband of the
mother thus legitimizing the child. This so-
lution, however, has the unique disadvan-
tage of favoring the birth of illegitimate
babies so that they may be made legitimate
by adoption. Besides, a good number of
these babies will never be adopted either
through the neglect of the parents or by the
furtive hope that the secret transaction be-
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tween patient, physician and donor will
never see the light of day. There is the ob-
jection too that formal adoption reveals
highly personal information such as the
artificial nature of conception, which be-
comes a matter of public record even though
sealed. In some jurisdictions, it is possible
that an adopting couple may run into stat-
utes which set up sectarian limitations and
the religion of the parents may be a source
of difficulty and possibly the religion of the
donor may become an issue and may have
to be revealed. It is also a fact, well known
to those who have gone through it, that
adoption is a lengthy procedure, usually
taking six months to a year, and one which
can be costly as well. Finally, adoption may
be beneficial for the child, but it still does
not clear entirely the legal status of the
parents nor does it solve the problem of
physician and donor.
To date, legislation on artificial insemi-
nation has been proposed in several states,
but none has been enacted into law. New
York City, however, regulates the practice
to some extent. Section 112 of the Sanitary
Code provides that only a duly licensed
physician "shall collect, offer for sale, sell or
give away human seminal fluid for the pur-
pose of causing artificial insemination .. "
Regulations 1 through 6 of the same section
provide for the physical examination of
donors, their freedom from certain diseases
and hereditary defects and blood tests. They
also provide that whenever artificial insemi-
nation is performed, the physician shall keep
a record showing the name of the physician,
the name and address of the recipient, the
results of the examinations as provided for
above, and the date of the artificial insemi-
nation. The regulations provide, of course,
that such records are confidential and shall
be open only to authorized persons. The
records required to be kept by the Sanitary
Code can be a source of worry and concern
to husband and wife, physician and donor.
Since 1948 six states have attempted to
pass statutes defining the status particularly
of AID children.4 1 In 1951 a bill was intro-
duced into the New York State Senate
"4 2
providing that where there is consent, ex-
press or implied, by the husband to the in-
semination, the child shall be deemed to be
the legitimate, natural child of both husband
and wife for all purposes; and husband and
wife and child shall be in the relation of
parent and child, and have all the rights and
duties of that relationship, including rights
of inheritance from each other. This bill
failed to pass the legislature.
Legislative proposals in Virginia, Wis-
consin and Indiana include provisions simi-
lar to the New York bill, and would con-
sider children born of heterologous artificial
insemination legitimate if both the husband
and mother consent. A bill introduced into
the Minnesota Legislature would make the
practice of artificial insemination unlawful,
but would declare legitimate children born
as a result of it. Another bill in that state
would regulate in detail the procedure. An
Ohio proposal would prohibit heretologous
artificial insemination entirely, would de-
clare children so conceived illegitimate and
would impose penal sanctions upon vio-
lators of the provision. 43
As to the likelihood of any legislative
action, one writer says: "The many prob-
lems, psychological, moral and legal, that
could arise from any attempt to legalize this
practice, are so great that it is doubtful if a
'157 J. Amer. Med. Assn. 1638, 1640 (Apr. 30,
1955).
'Sen. Int. No. 493, Pr. No. 493.
'3157 J. Amer. Med. Assn. 1638, 1640 (Apr. 30.
1955).
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physician [or anyone else] can look for-
ward to the security of enabling or protec-
tive legislation other than the indirect ap-
proval afforded by Section 112 of the
Sanitary Code of the City of New York. '44
While many solutions have been sug-
gested and much has been said from all sides,
artificial insemination by use of a donor's
sperm remains today one of the perplexing
problems of law. This is, however, no ordi-
nary problem. It is a problem which invades
the very fabric of society - the home. At
issue are very basic and fundamental values.
Traditionally, the home has been regarded
as the exclusive society of husband and wife
and child. Each was joined to the other by
ties more sacred than life itself. The child's
birthright, his greatest possession, was the
"Caddy, supra note 30 at 194.
certain knowledge of his parentage and his
secure status of legitimacy. These concepts
are now in the balance.
The precedents of courts or the statutes
of the legislature, however, are not the total
answer, for implied in artificial insemina-
tion are religious and moral values, the
ethical principles which underlie human be-
havior and the conduct of society. A com-
plete answer would also have to evaluate the
social repercussions of such a practice: what
effects would there be of a psychological and
emotional nature upon the husband, the
wife and the donor? How will it affect the
family life of the child? Will it change atti-
tudes on marriage, adultery and legitimacy?
These ethical and sociological aspects are to
be reviewed in the October issue of THE
CATHOLIC LAWYER.
